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INTRODUCTION 
Without doubt the year 1976 was an important year for the discussion on 
Computers and Society. In that year Joseph Weizenbaum‟s Computer Power 
and Human Reason was published and IFIP‟s TC 9 on Computers and 
Society was founded. In this contribution we want to give a short overview 
of the history since then and answer the question “what lessons can be 
learned from the past twenty-five years?” Following a review of the 
vigorous debate on the development of computers in society that has taken 
place during that period, four main questions are raised: 
1. Is the Information Society a new phenomenon or is it a question of 
emphasis? 
2. Has the development led to a new revolution as never seen before, as 
many scientists and policy makers would have us believe? 
3. What are, in a general sense, the consequences of this evolving 
information society? 
4. Can information technology be controlled, and if so, what are the main 
instruments of control? 
                                                     
1 The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official 
view of the European Commission on the subject. 
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COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY 
The history of the Computer and the history of Computers and Society 
do not run in parallel. Despite the work and the ideas of forerunners, like 
Schickard, Pascal, von Liebnitz, Babbage, Hollerith and many others, the 
history of the computer can be seen as having started in the mid 1930s, 
when Turing, Zuse and Aiken were producing working computers with a 
practical function. The real start however was shortly after the end of the 
Second World War. 
The consequences of computers on society were first seen in the field of 
labour. This is not surprising when we look at the enormous amount of 
literature devoted to the relationship between technology in general and 
work. Commencing with the influence of industrialisation and work in the 
middle of the 19th century through to the publications in the 1960s, we see a 
history of incremental development. It is one continuing story, in which 
sociologists and political scientists play a dominant role. Predictions that 
computer technology would soon create revolutionary changes in the 
number of people employed and in the length of the working week date 
from the late 1950s and early 1960s. At the same time we see the effects 
upon the content of the work studied and discussed. 
Surprisingly in the middle of the 1960s, there was one other field where 
the consequences of computing were seen very sharply: privacy. In 1967 the 
famous and influential book Privacy and Freedom by Alan Westin was 
published [24].  This book was the finishing touch to a project on „The 
Impact of Science and Technology on Privacy‟ that was carried out between 
1962 and 1966. Alan Westin was Director of Research of the project. 
Following this publication there were a number of articles and books on this 
subject. There was a change of emphasis from the computer as the cause of 
threats to privacy, to its role in data processing. An important difference 
with those publications dealing with labour questions is that it was not 
sociologists or political scientists writing about the issue this time, but 
lawyers. There are several other fields where the implications of computing 
were perceived and studied [21]. The organisational consequences are quite 
substantial, and one major issue has always been the extent to which the 
introduction of the computer leads to greater organisational centralisation. 
At the same time it became clear that the computer would, in any case, 
affect society at large: the growth in the service sector. Already by the 1950s 
over half of the United States labour force was employed in service 
industries, although it was argued that the shift would continue to progress 
gradually.  
It was theorised that radical changes could be expected if computerised 
information systems were to be used as efficiently and effectively in the 
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political decision-making process. Such amenities as education and medical 
care could be provided to all members of society. The relationship between 
computers and democracy received greater attention. Some believed that 
more and more decisions would be placed in the hands of experts, whereas 
others believed that computers could be used to establish a system of direct 
democracy. Ideally citizens should have a direct voice in political decision-
making. Through the sheer amount of information and the number and 
speed of new discoveries, there could be great difficulty for people in trying 
to keep „well informed‟.  
Therefore computers could have a great effect on education. In other 
words, the computer was seen as an aid in the process of using knowledge. 
Using computers in schools for instructional purposes was an important 
challenge, although computers raised the fear that they would increase 
dehumanisation by substituting machines for live teachers.  
Computers were seen as having major consequences for the natural as 
well as the social sciences when computers were used for both data analysis 
and problem solving. One field, art, was seen as rather futuristic: “The use 
of computers in the arts has often been a subject of either good-natured 
humour or ridicule.” [21, p.19]  Somewhat greater progress has made 
towards an understanding of human cognitive processes. Cybernetic 
research compares the functioning of the human brain with the functioning 
of computers. 
Many of the developments and implications outlined above are from the 
reader on computers and society, The Computer Impact, the first attempt to 
bring essays on implications of computer technology together in one 
volume. As the editor, Irene Taviss, stated, the essays are intended to 
present a broad sampling of the major issues raised. They were selected to 
give the reader a sense of the concrete developments of computer 
technology and their implications in specific spheres of social activity. 
Taviss hesitated on the choice of the title, although the most appropriate title 
for a discussion on the social implications of computer technology might 
appear to be Computers: Curse or Blessing? It is clear that the computer 
generated great fears and great hopes. “It has become a symbol for all that is 
good and all that is evil in modern society.” [21, p.3] 
Although this book was one of the first with a general overview and a 
vision of computers in society as a whole, it was important not necessarily 
for the attention it received, but for the discussion that was generated as a 
result.  
The real start of the social discussion on Computers and Society was 
probably the publication of Daniel Bell‟s The Post-Industrial Society [2].  
Bell‟s analysis posits that the advanced countries were moving from the 
industrial stage towards a „post-industrial stage‟ of development. He 
 4 
claimed that the majority of economically active people would earn their 
living from different kinds of post-industrial service sector occupations. In a 
pre-publication he indicated his notion of a „knowledge society‟, 
characterised by research and development and a knowledge field with a 
large proportion of the Gross National Product and a large share of 
employment [1]. Although his analysis was North American in orientation, 
we can assume it could be extended to a variety of other countries. 
As Annti Kasvio [17] rightly observes, the term „post-industrial‟ was 
however used for the first time by Alain Touraine in his book La societé 
post-industrielle, which was published in 1969. In this book, and following 
the tradition of sociologists dealing with computer technology, Touraine 
studied the consequences of the new society on labour and the industrial 
working class. 
A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE DISCUSSIONS – THE 
WEIZENBAUM PERIOD 
In 1976 a book was published that influenced the discussion on 
computer and society in an enormous way. It was Joseph Weizenbaum‟s 
Computer Power and Human Reason [22].  In this book the way in which 
computers can be used is criticised for the first time, specific applications 
are censored or perhaps even „excommunicated‟. Weizenbaum had been 
shocked by the way people reacted towards the computer program ELIZA, 
that he had designed to play the role of a psychologist or doctor. This 
experience led him to attach new importance to the question of the 
relationship between the individual and the computer. 
In his analysis Weizenbaum came to the conclusion that too much power 
is given to technology, in particular the computer. Many problems are seen 
as technical problems that can be solved by a computer. The computer is 
seen as more powerful than human beings, and „common sense‟ is replaced 
by science. The consequence is an over-emphasis on rationality and 
instrumentalism. Those who protest against this development are perceived 
as anti-technological, anti-scientific and, finally, as anti-intellectual. In 
reality, however, the price - which in Weizenbaum‟s view is actually paid - 
is servitude and impotence. Therefore human beings, in particular scientists 
and engineers, have responsibilities that transcend their situation. Every 
individual must act as if the whole future of the world, of humanity itself, 
depends on him or her. 
Two kinds of computer applications might either not be undertaken at 
all, or - if they are contemplated - should be approached with the utmost 
caution. The first kind includes all projects that propose to substitute a 
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computer system for a human function that involves interpersonal respect, 
understanding, or love. These are the human functions for which computers 
ought not to be substituted. The second kind of computer application that 
ought to be avoided is that which can easily be seen to have irreversible and 
not entirely foreseeable side effects. If computers cannot be shown to meet a 
pressing human need that cannot readily be met in any other way, then their 
use ought not to be pursued. 
THE BEGINNING OF THE DEBATE ON THE IMPACT 
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY  
The growth of interest in computers and information technology is 
largely due to this initial publication by Weizenbaum. Other resulting 
publications are two voluminous books published in 1979 and 1980. The 
first is The Computer Age: A Twenty-Year View, edited by Michael 
Dertouzos and Joel Moses [8], the second The Microelectronic Revolution, 
edited by Tom Forester 11].  Both books have similar content, although not 
necessarily treated in the same order. Dertouzos and Moses‟ publication 
contains five main chapters: Prospects for the Individual, Trends in 
Traditional Computer Uses, Socio-economic Effects and Expectations, 
Trends in the Underlying Technologies, and Critiques. Forester‟s book 
starts, as promised in the title, with the technical: The Micro-electronic 
Revolution, followed by Economic and Social Implications, and ends with a 
view of the future: the micro-electronic age. Although many of the impacts 
of computing are mentioned, in both books the emphasis is on economic 
aspects, in particular, the impact for employment and labour. 
It is both remarkable, and at the same time revealing, that in both 
volumes three articles are copied. The first is Bell‟s famous article on 
information society
i
, the second a critical reaction of Weizenbaum on Bell‟s 
ideas, and the third a reply to Weizenbaum by Bell. Since these articles are 
widely discussed and have each in their own way contributed to a more 
general discussion of the social implication of information society, we will 
give a short overview of them.  
In the comprehensive tradition of his earlier publications Bell gives an 
overview of the changes on societal level [4, pp. 163-212]. What he was 
calling in 1968 the Knowledge Society and in 1973 the Post Industrial 
Society, becomes the information society, a term that has since been 
adopted to describe this society. In Bell‟s view, we are living in a society in 
which information and knowledge are the crucial variables. This 
information explosion can only be handled through the expansion of 
computerised and subsequently automated information systems. This means 
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that the computer is only a tool for managing mass society, since it is the 
mechanism that orders and processes the transactions - whose huge number 
has been mounting almost exponentially because of the increase in social 
interactions. His basic premise is “that knowledge and information” are 
becoming the strategic resource and transforming agent of the post-
industrial society. Inevitably, the onset of far-reaching social changes, 
especially when they proceed as these do through the medium of specific 
technologies, confronts a society with “major policy questions”. In his view, 
any technology, such as the computer, is only instrumental, and its impact 
depends on other social and cultural factors. 
In his response Weizenbaum speaks of the „Computer‟ Revolution - to 
make clear that it is not information that causes the changes but the 
computer [439-463]. He agrees that society is transforming into an 
information society, however it is not information that is responsible for that 
but the computer. The central question therefore is not who is responsible 
for the information, but who is responsible for the actions based on these 
computer systems. The crucial issue is that of responsibility and control, and 
the consequences of the computer.  
In his reply Bell does not add anything to the content of the argument. 
He begins with the remark that Weizenbaum is knocking down an open 
door. He repeats that the computer is purely instrumental. The crucial 
decisions are sociological, not technological. In his view Weizenbaum is a 
moral absolutist with tunnel vision. 
Clearly stark positions are taken up. While both authors agree that we 
are tending to live in an information society, their analysis differs and, with 
that, so do their questions as to what has to be done to prevent unforeseen, 
and unwanted, side effects. In Bell‟s vision it is information and knowledge 
that determine the development and there is nothing that can or should be 
done to handle or correct this development. Weizenbaum on the other hand 
blames the computer and incites human beings, especially scientists, to take 
up their responsibility and raise questions such as: “Who is the beneficiary 
of our much-advertised technological progress and who are the victims? 
What limits ought we, the people in general, and scientists and engineers 
particularly, to impose on the applications of computation to human affairs? 
What is the impact of the computer, not only on the economies of the world 
or on the war potential of nations and so on, but on the self-image of human 
beings and on human dignity? What irreversible forces is our worship of 
high technology, symbolized most starkly by the computer, bringing into 
play? Will our children be able to live with the world we are here and now 
constructing? Much depends on answers to these questions” [23].  
In a sense the Weizenbaum-Bell dispute is the forerunner of the debate 
which still dominates today. It is not only information versus computer, but 
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it is also the discussion between the optimist and the pessimist, between 
people who see information technology as a societal blessing and those who 
only see the darker side, the side of the shadow. The discussion between 
information and technology was more or less decided in favour of the latter, 
when Tom Forester presented his next volume on The Information 
Technology Revolution [12].  From that time on everybody talked of the 
new science of collecting, storing, processing, and transmitting information. 
Although the position seems to be a compromise between Weizenbaum and 
Bell, in reality the emphasis is always on technology. 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE TEACHING 
CURRICULUM 
Already in the beginning of the 1970s there began a search for a 
curriculum on Computers and Society. Among the first to raise attention to 
this idea was E. Horowitz and his colleagues, who cited three purposes for 
such a course: 
- to educate computer scientists on the present and future impact of 
computer technology; 
- to investigate some of the difficult moral questions concerning the 
responsibility of scientists; and, 
- to gain a more humanistic perspective on the use and misuse of 
computers. [14]  
Some years later these courses were elaborated in more detail. Two of 
them became more or less examples of university-level courses, because 
they had a broader impact and were more seriously discussed in the 
literature. Willy Jensen made a distinction between the broad arena where 
the consequences of computers were to be observed [16]:  
- Economic life: trade, industry, automation, management, structural 
changes; 
- Government: new services, bureaucracy; 
- Work: employment, quality of labour; 
- Culture: education, communication, informational media, quality of 
information, minorities; 
- Leisure: quality of life, social contacts, entertainment, telework. 
All of these developments were seen to have important consequences on 
democracy, freedom, protection of privacy, welfare and possibilities of 
control 
A most important and useful classification was made by Friedrich, who 
classified the consequences of computing into the social aggregate hierarchy 
of international, national, business and individual levels [15]: 
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International level: the battle on the information market. Examples are 
the exploitation of databases, communication satellites, the computer 
industry. 
National level: national information monopolies, technology policies. 
Political questions are solved with computer supported planning and 
decision systems, networking, the gap between citizen and government, 
vulnerability of society due to the dependency on information. 
Business level: quality of work, employment, control of the workplace, 
personal information systems. 
Individual level: man in control. Loss of individual space of freedom, 
privacy, technical relations instead of human relations, technical help 
instead of human help. 
THE POST WEIZENBAUM PERIOD 
After publication of the volumes by Dertouzos and Moses, and Forester, a 
whole range of books were published detailing the social implications of the 
information society - very often as a spin-off of a conference devoted to 
such a theme [5].  This period culminated in The Information Age trilogy of 
Manuel Castells in which he searches for the social and economic dynamics 
of the information age [7]. In these books Castells sees as his main task the 
analysis of the informational modes of development of societies. This 
analysis revolves around three fundamental axes: the changes that take place 
in the areas of material production, human experiences, and the structures of 
power. Two main trends are seen as the driving force: globalisation of the 
economy and the digital revolution. 
In the mid 1990s, when information was recognised as an important 
factor of economic growth, we see a political interest emerging. One of the 
early actors in this field was the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(MITI), which made Japan the global leader in the development and 
production of microelectronics [17].  After the stock market crash in 1987 
and the economic recession in the early 1990s many political leaders looked 
to the digital revolution as a form of salvation. We can cite, as an example, 
the United States‟ National Information Infrastructure Programme, launched 
by president Bill Clinton and vice-president Al Gore. 
This kind of stance was taken up in the European Commission‟s report 
„Europe and the Global Information Society‟.  The report was prepared for 
the European Council meeting in Corfu by the so-called High-Level Group 
on the Information Society, chaired by Martin Bangemann [13]. The report 
starts with two key messages. The first is that the advent of the information 
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society is inevitable and will lead to an industrial revolution comparable to 
that of the 19th century. The second is that Europe‟s entry into the 
information society will be market-driven. Therefore a common regulatory 
framework must be set up at the level of the European Union in order to 
maximise the effect of the market while guaranteeing an appropriate level of 
protection for intellectual property, personal data, and network security. 
This last statement is noteworthy insofar as, for the first time at 
international level, it was accepted and admitted that the development 
towards an information society is accompanied by risks. “The main risk lies 
in the creation of a two-tier society of have and have-nots, in which only a 
part of the population has access to the new technology, is comfortable 
using it and can fully enjoy its benefits.” [13, 8] but this is not the only risk. 
A regulatory response is also needed in key areas like intellectual property, 
privacy and media ownership. Above all encryption becomes  increasingly 
important, with the proviso that governments need power to override 
encryption for the purpose of fighting against crime and protecting national 
security. 
Whether this attention to societal risk was purely instrumental in terms 
of avoiding the possibility that „individuals will reject the new information 
culture and its instruments‟, it was the first time that an internationally 
influential body accepted and confirmed that there are indeed risks. In light 
of the influence this report has had for various national programmes in their 
approach to the development of an information society, and that these 
programmes have almost always paid attention to societal and human 
aspects of the information society, its relevance cannot be underestimated. 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 
In his article on the Information Society, Bell uses four criteria to judge 
when this entry has been accomplished  [4] 
In almost all social processes, storing, processing and use of information 
are the central factors (information as new energy instead of the previous 
human power and electricity); 
More than half of the employed population consists of people working in 
the information sector (information as an important economic force); 
Information technology (computer and telecommunications) form the 
most important infrastructure in society; 
Most social and political decisions are changed drastically by the use of 
information and information technology (information as an important factor 
of change). 
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Looking at these criteria we can confirm that, at the start of the 21st 
century, we have indeed entered the information society, but at the same 
time we can raise the question: What is new in that? Have we experienced 
the revolution that many people would have us believe? 
As we have seen, Forester first speaks of the microelectronics revolution 
and later of the information technology revolution. Barry Sherman uses the 
word „The New Revolution‟ and even Castells uses this heavily laden word: 
“A technological revolution, centred around information technology, is 
reshaping, at accelerated pace, the material basis of society” [7].  
But is this society indeed a radical new phenomenon or has it been more 
an evolution than a revolution? To answer this question we will reconsider 
the four criteria presented by Bell, starting with the importance of 
information. 
THE RISE OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: 
REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION? 
As a consequence of the use of terminology, it is clear that the main 
feature of information society and information technology is information. 
Recording, processing and distributing information is as old as mankind. 
Proof of this can be seen in the caves in France, Spain and Africa, just as in 
Egyptian hieroglyphics. Distributing information in a very primitive form 
can be seen in the smoke signals of north American Indians and the horn 
blowers in some other countries. The importance (and consequences!) of 
information can also be read about in the Bible where the history of the first 
census takings is told. Counting people is an early instrument in the 
preparation of war making. 
During the Middle Ages the importance of information rose, strongly 
related to the development of the first important type of information 
technology: printing. Although there is discussion whether printing was first 
developed by the German Johannes Gutenberg or the Dutchman Laurens 
Janszoon Coster, there is nevertheless agreement on the importance of this 
invention. 
As a consequence, the production of paper was stimulated, becoming 
one of the main products of the Industrial Age. In 1714 a new phase in this 
development was the invention of the typewriter by the Englishman Henry 
Mill, the forefather of the electric typewriter and the modern text processor. 
Information is more than text. Information is also a means to recording 
and distributing of sound and images. Thomas Edison‟s name is strongly 
related to the development of recording and distributing sound. Telephone, 
telex and telegraph are the results of his creativity, just as some time later 
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was the gramophone. This development was later combined with the 
microphone, developed by Alexander Graham Bell and first demonstrated at 
the World Exhibition in Chicago in 1876. 
Even more impressive is the development of the practice of recording 
and distributing images. For the first time images were automatically 
recorded successfully in the middle of the 18th century. This resulted in the 
first photographic-style images at the beginning of the 19th century, rapidly 
leading in the direction of the modern cameras and movies („moving 
pictures‟). All these inventions have come together in computer technology, 
which finally combines text, sound and images using the calculating 
principles of Pascal and numerous others. 
Information is, as we have seen from this short overview, an important 
factor of the new form of information society, but to say that it is a new 
phenomenon is going too far. Information has always been important. Its 
importance has increased and it is perhaps more important than ever, but it 
cannot seen as the factor underlying society. This means at the same time 
that there have always been people working on the collection, processing 
and distribution of information. Their number has also increased. On the one 
side, as a consequence the number of more traditional jobs has been 
reduced. On the other side, new information jobs have been created (such as 
programmers and system analysts). All these are signs that society has 
changed, but it is not the first time that a new technological invention has 
had societal consequences. The same has been seen with telex, telephone 
and television. The most important difference is that we have, for the first 
time, a convergence of all the technical components with the result that the 
consequences have been more rapid and radical. However, they have not 
been revolutionary in the sense that the consequences are unexpected and 
unpredictable. One of the proofs of this is that even now, after twenty-five 
years, nobody can tell exactly when the information society has made its 
entrance, in the same way that is impossible to say when the industrial 
revolution came into force. 
We therefore prefer to speak of gradual evolution instead of revolution. 
This means that we are almost never totally surprised by the consequences 
of the development, but in most cases can more or less predict not only what 
the consequences are, but also to what extent and in what areas they are 
likely to appear. For that reason we can even make an analytical scheme, in 
part based on the teaching courses presented by Jensen and Friedrich, of the 
fields where the consequences of the information society will become 
visible. 
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TOWARDS A MODEL FOR AN INVENTORY OF THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
Looking at the developments of the last twenty-five years, we can see a 
variety of technical innovations, all of which in one way or another have 
influenced human life. Describing all these consequences asks for a kind of 
classification. The first distinction was made between consequences for the 
labour force and those affecting everything else. Other distinctions or 
classifications took the particular sector where the consequences were seen 
as a starting point: healthcare, education, business, transport, art and 
science, defence and the mass media. Although this type of classification 
had the advantage that each separate sector could be described in detail, the 
disadvantage was the resulting overlap. A lot of developments happened in 
each and every sector with consequences there for labour, privacy and 
human relations. 
Although the classifications of Jensen and Friedrich have advantages and 
disadvantages, a combination of classifications has been shown to be the 
most appropriate analytical structure: that is, there is a distinction between 
macro-, meso- and micro- levels.  
The macro level describes society as a whole: national and international. 
At that level we can think of the consequences for employment, the digital 
divide, distinctions between the information rich and information poor, the 
growing vulnerability, and the problem of information overload.  
At a lower level we have the meso-level or the level of the organisation, 
institutions, and the people who work and live in that organisation. This 
includes organisational changes, quality of labour, and privacy of the 
employee. With privacy we are on the frontier of the meso- and the micro-
level.  
At the micro-level the consequences for the individual are the primary 
focus: telework, privacy, human relations, and family life. Although this 
classification - as with all analytical distinctions - has some overlaps, it has 
proved useful for describing the general consequences of computing. 
CONTROLLING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: THE 
DEBATE  
The conclusion we have made in this contribution - that technological 
development is an evolution rather than a revolution - is more than a mere 
statement. It is also a conviction that consequences may be predicted and 
that it is possible one way or another to control the development - in 
particular the all too negative consequences. This argument opposes the 
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ruling attitude of technological determinism which asserts that 
developments can neither be predicted nor controlled. Such determinism 
reduces humankind to powerless pawns who can only accept their fate and 
wait to see what other people will do to help them. It is our belief that more 
can be done by human beings themselves than is often admitted. 
Over the course of time there has always been a vehement discussion 
between the optimists and pessimists regarding the possibility of controlling 
technology. It is as Abbe Mowshowitz observed: “The central question is 
the nature of technology‟s role in our society. Is it purely instrumental, as 
most observers believe; or has it become an autonomous, formative element 
in human affairs?” [18] The pessimists believe that technology is a 
completely autonomous power in itself that cannot be controlled. In other 
words, the consequences of technology, both positive as well as negative, 
have to be accepted as they are
ii
. The optimists, like Dorothy Nelkin, believe 
that in one way or another technology can be influenced and directed. This 
view is at the same time a vision of the future, so perfectly demonstrated by 
the statement of James Branch Cabell: “The optimist proclaims that we live 
in the best of all possible worlds, and the pessimist fears that this is true”iii. 
Langdon Winner, who made a study of autonomous technology, agrees that 
that it is not a conflict between pessimists and optimists, but a question of 
whether technology is out of control and follows its own course. In his view 
therefore technology influences all aspects of human life. It is a form of 
technological determinism that has as its characteristics firstly, that the 
technical base of a society is the fundamental condition affecting all patterns 
of social existence, and secondly, that changes in technology are the single 
most important source of change in society [25]. 
The discussion on autonomous technology and technological 
determinism was in particular fuelled by publication in 1954 of a book by 
the French sociologist and philosopher Jacques Ellul „La Technique ou 
l‟enjeu du siècle‟ [9]. This book received international attention after its 
American translation to „The Technological Society‟. In Ellul‟s view 
“technique” [technology] as a totality of methods is always striving at 
absolute efficiency, with the consequence that spontaneous actions 
disappear and we are left in a completely artificial world. In this world the 
individual‟s role will be less and less important in technical evolution. 
Technique has become a power endowed with its own peculiar force and is 
for that reason influencing everything: the economy, the state and the 
essence of what it is to be a human being. In that sense it even influences 
human behaviour, which is now oriented to adapting humankind to the 
technical world. In Ellul‟s view, in the technological society, there is no 
place left for a vulnerable human being. “The state, on the contrary, has 
need of whole, strong human beings, in full moral, intellectual, and physical 
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vigour, who alone can serve it best. What the state requires is the technical 
means for integrating completely whole beings, and these means are on the 
point of becoming reality” [9, 386].  It will come as no surprise that Ellul‟s 
vision on the future is gloomy. Through the developments of technique the 
state will become totalitarian and will absorb citizens‟ lives completely. 
Although Ellul was challenged in his opinions by numerous opponents, he 
never changed his mind and in later publications he repeated his forecasts of 
a totalitarian society. 
In discussing Ellul‟s view of technology we should not underestimate the 
period in which the book was originally written (1954) – that is, the social 
and political context in which it was set. It was written at the time of the 
Cold War, when human beings seemed to be less important, and when they 
were intensively studied not only by sociological methods, but in particular 
by psychological testing. It was also the period of the lie detector. In that 
sense Ellul‟s pessimism to a greater or lesser extent was endorsed by 
philosophers like Helmut Schelsky, Erich Fromm, Forester, and Langdon 
Winner. It is the virtue of Winner, however, that he focussed attention on 
the problem of human beings in a technological society. 
Ellul has been severely attacked for his pessimism, or as some have 
called it, fatalism. In particular his belief in technical determinism, the 
argument that technique is the prime mover controlling all developments, 
was fundamentally criticised. Determinism as a part of philosophy is a 
notion that has been in evidence since its beginning, only the name of prime 
mover has changed: God, Economy, Culture, Power. The difference is 
however that technical determinism in particular is criticised as not making 
a distinction between technology, technique and the use of technique. 
Freeman, Layton, and Winner are among Ellul‟s critics. As Winner states 
“Ellul fails to notice any difference between invention and technical 
implementation and apparently believes that for all intents and purposes 
these activities are identical” [25, 64].  In his, and others, view there is a 
clear distinction between what is happening in the laboratory and what 
happens when discoveries are put to work in the world at large. 
Therefore a distinction should be made between the knowledge aspect 
and the application aspect. In some languages this distinction can be 
clarified in terminology between technology and technique
iv
.  Between both 
aspects there is a time lag, although due to technological developments this 
lag is becoming smaller and smaller
v
. But it is not only necessary to make a 
distinction between technology and technique, between knowledge and 
application, but also between the application and use of the technique. 
Numerous examples show how the use of technique is dependent on several 
societal aspects; money, the state of the art, politics. Therefore it is too 
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simple to say that technology is absolutely determined. Technique can, to a 
greater or lesser extent, be controlled. 
THREE FORMS OF CONTROL 
The question that we should therefore ask is: what can be done? To 
answer this question we would again go back to the past and offer up the old 
classification of Nelkin [19]. Nelkin presented a general model for control, 
which can be used for assessing control mechanisms. She uses the well-
known distinction between control at three stages: afterwards, before and 
during and calls them respectively reactive, anticipatory and participatory 
control. Reactive control is oriented towards the protection of interests of 
human beings and is a type of control exercised by institutions and 
government reacting to a certain development. Well known forms of 
reactive control are legal and other punitive or disciplinary measures that 
attempt to prevent all too negative consequences. Also included in this 
category are the possibilities of claims and complaints, as are expert groups 
that are installed once the developments are started.  
Participatory control deals with the involvement of citizens in the 
introduction and regulation of technology. In this capacity the most well 
known forms are protest movements and activities aimed at raising 
awareness. In some sense this has also been introduced in the labour 
movement under the heading of participatory design. Another form that is 
sometimes mentioned is self-regulation, under the condition that (consumer) 
organisations are involved in the process. 
Anticipatory control consists of procedures for predicting social, 
political and economic consequences of new scientific and technological 
developments. This is particularly important when consequences are 
becoming visible, usually when the development has matured and changes 
are almost impossible. The most well known form of anticipatory control is 
Technology Assessment: identifying the possibilities of applied research 
and technologies together with the unwanted side-effects. “It is a method of 
analysis that systematically appraises the nature, significance, status and 
merit of a technological process” [p 428].  
Looking at these forms of control it is significant that reactive control is 
the one that is most used, followed by participatory control. Despite all 
pressures, participatory control has had little or no influence. For an 
appropriate form of control of information technology all three types of 
control are needed in combination. The practice, however, is that the 
emphasis is placed on reactive control, and for a small part on participatory 
control. For David Flaherty such practice gives every reason to be critical. 
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“The belief that surveillance societies are not going to emerge because of 
efforts in data protection is naive; in fact, the existence of Data Protection 
Commissioners may actually stimulate the flavouring of surveillance 
societies by lulling the public into a false sense of security.” [10, 381] The 
dangers exposed by Flaherty‟s observation of reactive control are alarming. 
A greater emphasis should be placed on the two other forms of control, 
anticipatory and participatory. 
CONCLUDING THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 
Reviewing these last twenty-five years and more, we can see three 
important periods. The first period (before 1976) can be seen as the period of 
growing awareness in several fields. The most dominant are labour and 
privacy. In numerous articles and books the consequences of computing, 
mostly in a negative sense, are predicted as a result of the emergence of the 
computer. The privacy discussion during this period is concerned with 
computer privacy, rather than informational privacy.  
The second period (1976-1993) can be seen as the period of growing 
scientific awareness with, as an important starting point, the critical analysis of 
Weizenbaum who confronts computer power with the importance of human 
reason. Numerous analyses are made based on inventories of the consequences 
of computing. The publications of Dertouzos and Moses in collaboration, and 
Forester, are the most significant examples. It is also the time that university 
courses on the theme of computers and society were started. Together with 
these analyses some thought is given to what can be done. Faced with a 
dominant trend towards technological determinism, legal solutions are sought. 
As Nelkin observes, it is the time of reactive control. 
Starting around 1993, a third period of political awareness begins. At this 
time, it is not the social implications that are of concern, but the consequences 
of these consequences. They are seen as a potential obstacle for the use and the 
development of the so-called electronic highway (which we now commonly 
think of as simply the Internet) and thus hindering the possibilities for 
economic growth. In an integrated way all types of measures are promoted to 
tackle the various social implications. A combination of legal, technical and 
self-regulatory measures are suggested.  
What however is missing is an holistic approach – only in this way will we 
be able to get a real grip on the development of the information society. Such a 
holistic approach can be reached when at least three conditions are met: 
First of all we have to be convinced that technique is not autonomous but 
can in a way be predicted and controlled; 
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The three stages of development in social consequences of information 
communication technologies – awareness, scientific knowledge and political 
willingness – must be integrated; 
In controlling technique a combination of reactive, participatory and 
anticipatory control is necessary.  
It is in this arena particularly that TC 9 Computers and Society has 
attempted to focus its activities and to show the whole sphere, breadth, depth, 
and complexity of discussions in relation to the introduction of computing into 
the social arena.  
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i
  Although it is sometimes suggested that Bell was the person who introduced the term  
„information society‟, Marien states that information society apparently was first used in 
Japan in the late 1960s by Kenichi Kohyama. See Michael Marien “Some Questions for 
the Information Society” in [12, pp. 648-660].  
ii
  As a consequence the distinction between the optimists and pessimists is not always true 
- some believe that this autonomous technology will bring a better world and others are 
opposing this. 
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iii
  Our translation of the following German expression “Der Optimist erklärt, dasz wir in 
der besten aller möglichen Welten leben; de Pessimist fürchtet, dasz das wahr ist”. Cited 
in Heinz Brandt, Nostalgie als Schwellenangst, in Technologie und Politik, aktuell 
Magazin, nr. 1, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1975, p.33-47. 
iv
  It is curious that Winner mentions the distinction but at the same time uses technology 
and technics in the same sense in the title of his book. 
v
  In particular Alvin Toffler gives several examples of the diminishing lag. See Alvin 
Toffler, The Third Wave, New York, Toronto, London: Bantam Books, 1980. 
